10 letters exchanged between the British High Commissioner to Egypt and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915-6
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The Balfour declaration, McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and Sykes-Picot Agreement.
The Balfour declaration, McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and Sykes-Picot Agreement.
This is a hugely controversial issue with a number of different interpretations from major historians.
To start with, of the three, the Balfour declaration was the only one made for public consumption. The Sykes-Picot agreement was revealed by the Bolsheviks after the separate peace with Germany. Hussein-McMahon was first published in its entirety by George Antonius in the 30s from a translation of the Arabic originals.
Part of the issue for how this state of affairs came about has to do with how British foreign policy worked in the period and during the war. In theory, prosecution of the war was divided by the British between the Indian office and Egypt. Hussein McMahon was the first one negotiated, and the Egypt was given an enormous amount of discretion to negotiate with the Sharif of Mecca. It must be remembered that this is a wartime document, being negotiated under pressure, by a relatively minor civil servant, and the document reflects that. Sykes-Picot was a product of the foreign office, while the Balfour declaration came straight out of the cabinet. The level of coordination between these offices in each instant was minimal aside from generally following the plan laid out by the DeBunsen commission of 1915.
Sykes Picot was negotiated later. It has been argued that Sykes Picot was a British French attempt to actually carry out the intentions of the Hussein McMahon correspondences, but reflecting the fact that the Arab revolt was directly the product of European support and could not be sustained without that support. In other words, Hussein McMahon promised land for victory, when that victory failed to materialize, the allies negotiated Sykes-Picot. Again, this is a hugely controversial issue.
The Balfour declaration is almost an entirely different question. The issue is that the British promised a national homeland to the Jews but also stated that this would in no way prejudice pre-existing Palestinian status. It's not clear that they thought these claims were inherently contradictory at the time, but as the years progressed this was certainly made so. It's also the "strangest" in that unlike the Arab revolt or the British/French alliance there was no actual group whose support could be gained by this to win the war. One explanation comes in Tom Segev's "One Palestine, Complete" which posits that the British cabinet actually believed in a Jewish control of major industrial sectors as well as American influence and thought supporting Zionism would benefit them. Several cabinet members and the Prime Minister also seem to have, through their own Christianity, simply been sympathetic to the cause.
Faisal famously promised the Zionists that he would uphold the Balfour declaration so long as the British upheld Hussein McMahon. Obviously they didn't.
Another interpretation is that, in point of fact, the mandate system that was eventually carried out was not a reflection of Sykes-Picot. That British/French hegemony was not the same as British/French rule as envision by Sykes Picot. The British might have allowed themselves to believe this, in that they allowed Faisal, at first, to control Syria, then Iraq. Abdullah to control Jordan and possibly later to rule Palestine and Syria, and Hussein to rule the Hejaz. Only Iraq and Transjordan ended up with Hashemite control in the end.
Yet again, by the end of the war a number of British policy makers were apparently quite skeptical of the ability of Arab states to attain independence without British/French support, including T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell.
In short, the negotiations were a mess, taken as a war time measure, and reflective of a bureaucracy that was poorly coordinated. The meaning of British promises and the extent to which they upheld them is a hugely debated issue and one that will continue to provide historical fodder probably til kingdom come.
Sources: One of the most interesting sources is Balfours 1919 memorandum, shortly before he resigned, summarizing British negotiations over the past five years and is excellent in how frank it is. Balfour clearly recognized that there was a serious problem at hand: http://www.scribd.com/doc/60431057/Memorandum-by-Mr-Balfour-Paris-Respecting-Syria-Palestine-And-mia
The best work I've come across, which is extremely readable and summarizes the various positions and negotiations made is D.K. Fieldhouse's "Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958."
edit: full apologies in that I've written this rather quickly and it's still quite long and I'm not sure that I've specifically answered your question. It's quite a large question, and although I've read a lot on this topic I've barely scratched the surface. Source wise another interesting document are the notes of the Council of Four in 1919, which are less explicit than Balfour's memo, but show the kind of alliance level negotiation that was going on: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1919Parisv05.p0011&id=FRUS.FRUS1919Parisv05&isize=M
Obviously if anyone else has more to add please do so. And let me know if you have any questions about anything more specific and I'll try to answer it.
More on reddit.comDid the Hussein McMahon Correspondence promise an independent Arab Palestine?
Did the Hussein McMahon Correspondence promise an independent Arab Palestine?
Quite frankly, it depends on who you ask. Some argue that the British were deliberately being vague, but McMahon wasn't in on it. Some argue they went back on their word. Some argue that it was never promised.
Here's a few examples:
From Righteous Victims by Benny Morris:
During the second half of 1915, British Middle East hands were gradually converted to the idea of an Arab revolt. But initially, the high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, vacillated as to the price. He could not reject Hussein's far-reaching territorial claims, lest he torpedo the prospective revolt. On the other hand, he could not accept them: Britain's own growing territorial interests were at stake, as well as French claims on Syria-Lebanon and other areas. On October 24, 1915, having consulted with London, McMahon took the bull by the horns and replied: "The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the West of the districts or vilayets of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation." McMahon added that the Arabs must recognize "Great Britain's established position and interests" in the vilayets of Baghdad and of Basra, and a "special [British] administrative arrangement" would have to be established there. Britain was saying that the Syrian coast, including Lebanon, was to be excluded from the Arab area and kept for French or Franco-British dominion. So too was Iraq. Present-day Syria and Jordan, on the other hand, which constituted the Ottoman vilayet of Syria, were to be included, along with the Arabian Peninsula, in the "independent" Arab area.
There remained Palestine, which had nowhere been explicitly mentioned--as, indeed, India Office official Arthur Hirtzel pointed out: "Jerusalem ranks third among the Moslem holy places, and the Arabs will lay great stress on it. But are we going to hand our own holy places to them without conditions?" For decades thereafter the protagonists were to argue about what McMahon had really meant. The British, including McMahon, and the Zionists maintained that he had implicitly included Palestine in the areas "west" of Damascus excluded from prospective Arab rule, though a minority among British officials (Dr. Arnold Toynbee of the Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department for one) held that McMahon had in fact earmarked Palestine as part of the Arab state. The Arabs argued that, as Palestine was not to the west but to the southwest of Damascus, and as it had not been explicitly excluded, it was to be part of the Arab state. On balance it appears that they were right. McMahon had specifically set aside for "non-Arab" rule Lebanon and the northwestern Syrian coastal regions. Motivated by concern for French sensibilities, he had omitted explicit reference to Palestine, and nowhere in his letters had he concerned himself with Zionism or Jewish claims. But he may well have misunderstood the Foreign Office's brief, for London by this time was clearly seeking to exclude Palestine from the independent Arab sphere.
Pg. 69-70.
From Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict by Charles D. Smith:
McMahon stated that in the areas "where Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France;' it pledged "to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca" and to protect the holy places against external aggression. These areas appeared to include, at the least, central Syria, including Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo, northern Iraq, and Arabia.
This declaration, although apparently specific in certain instances, was intended to promise more than it would fulfill. A bone of scholarly contention has been the use of the word district to refer to Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo. The Arabic word used was wilaya (in Turkish vilayet), which usually meant "province" and was employed in that sense with respect to Basra and Baghdad in the same letter. But when referring to the four Syrian cities, it signified to McMahon "cities and adjacent environs," a meaning clear in McMahon's own references to the term and the areas involved." The importance of this distinction rests in what was intended to lie west of these "districts": If "districts" meant cities, as McMahon felt at the time, then the areas west of them would incorporate an area from Lebanon, including Beirut, in the south extending north beyond Alexandretta, already omitted from the region that Husayn had demanded. In this interpretation, Palestine, unmentioned in the letter, was not specifically excluded from the Arab territory to be independent after the war. The British later claimed, however, that the term "wilaya" signified an administrative district when applied to Damascus. According to this interpretation, the wilaya of Damascus included eastern Palestine, the land across the Jordan River, and omitted western Palestine, which by this time had been promised to the Zionists by the Balfour Declaration. As subsequent developments demonstrate, the British never intended to cede Palestine to the Arabs, even though some officials acknowledged privately that McMahon's letter seemed to include it.
Pgs. 61-62.
Then there's what you read. If you look at this:
The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and a Reply Arnold Toynbee and Isaiah Friedman Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 5, No. 4 (1970), pp. 185-201
The journal there is linked to JSTOR right here.
As you can see, the support for Friedman's view continues. But wait! Charles D. Smith wrote an article:
The Invention of a Tradition: The Question of Arab Acceptance of the Zionist Right to Palestine during World War I Charles D. Smith Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 22, No. 2 (Winter, 1993), pp. 48-61
Linked here, trying to rebut Friedman!
Then you've got Elie Kedouri, in In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations 1914-1939, who disagrees with Smith and agrees that Palestine was not promised.
Who do you believe? It's impossible to really say: We can't go back in time and ask McMahon what he meant, and what Husayn believed, and if there was intent to deceive, etc.. There is only, as far as I've seen, a lack of clarity via different interpretations of the same material, as with so much else. That's about all you can really do, is try to look at them and compare (unless you read some of them and make up your own interpretation)!
More on reddit.comCan anyone reconcile for me why the Sykes-Picot Agreement is in conflict with the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence?
Can anyone reconcile for me why the Sykes-Picot Agreement is in conflict with the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence?
Because Sykes Picot gave land that was promised to Hussein to the French. Parts of what are now Syria mostly.
More on reddit.comMcMahon–Hussein correspondence Deal Implemented
McMahon–Hussein correspondence Deal Implemented
Good faith questions may violate rule 10 (see point #7 in the rule explanation). And I don't get the impression of bad faith from your post (so this is not a moderating comment), but an advise to elaborate what is McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and their impact on the scheme of things.
Users may engage more if you do.
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